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PRIVATE LAW
Corp.,14 where the court reiterated the well-established rule that
a mortgage continues to have its full effectiveness despite a
cancellation on the basis of a fraudulent release.15 Likewise,
during the interval allowed for inscription, vendors' liens 16 and
building contract privileges 7 are temporarily secret liens not
discoverable in the public records. Incidentally noteworthy in-
cidents of the opinion in the principal case are (1) a footnote
distinction between the civil law attitude concerning stare decisis
in the branches of the law which call for greater certainty and
those in which the nature of the subject calls for greater adapt-
ability,' and (2) the forceful assertion that Civil Code article 21
does not open the door to the admission of equitable principles





Normally, one co-owner cannot prescribe against other co-
owners because his possession is precarious. Even if he occupies
physically the entire property, his status as co-owner incor-
porates recognition of the rights of the others, and therefore he
is not in possession as owner of their shares. However, this does
not completely exclude the possibility of acquisitive prescription
where the physical occupation is under circumstances which are
inconsistent with recognition of other rights and hostile to any
such possible claims.
This is what occurred in Continental Oil Co. v. Arceneaux.1
14. 183 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writ granted, 249 La. 385, 186
So.2d 630 (1966).
15. Citing Zimmer v. Fryer, 190 La. 814, 183 So. 166 (1938); see also
Gallagher v. Conner, 138 La. 633, 70 So. 539 (1915).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3274 (1870).
17. LA. R.S. 9:4801 et 8eq. (1950).
18. 183 So. 2d at 465, n. 1.
19. Id. at 467 - text supported by note 4.
*Professor of Law. Iouisiana State University.




One child purchased the parental property at an administrator's
sale which did not have all the elements of validity. Thirty-eight
years later, the other children contested his title to the whole
property but the court sustained his plea of 30-year acquisitive
prescription. The court found that his possession of the entire
tract had been "open, public and unequivocal possession as
owner under a deed translative of title" and "even though the
deed be invalid ... the co-owner's possession ordinarily is then
regarded as hostile to any claim of his co-owners." '2
Obviously, each case must be examined in the light of its
particular facts, and it is an interesting coincidence that the
same court decided another case in the same way. In Detraz v.
Pere,3 one co-heir was found to have thirty-six years of satis-
factory possession as owner of a whole tract which the other
co-heir alleged had been acquired from their ancestor by a simu-
lated sale. Under the circumstances, his possession was adverse
and hostile as well as satisfying the other requirements for
acquisitive prescription.
Just Title and Good Faith
For the ten-year prescription, both of these elements must
be present. While there is often a relationship between just title
and good faith, each is nevertheless a separate and distinct con-
cept which must be tested independently of the other. It is con-
fusing to find the two ideas run together.
Just title is an objective element and may be any appropriate
mode of acquisition 'Which appears on its face to be valid while
in truth it is defective. Good faith is the honest and justifiable
belief of having acquired full ownership of the property.
In Lloyd v. Register,4 the wife acquired a property from her
voluntarily separated husband, through the interposition of her
mother. Under these circumstances, the title was an absolute
nullity.5 In disposing of the wife's plea of ten-year acquisitive
prescription, the court said: "By just title means a title which
the possessor may have received from any person whom he
2. 183 So. 2d at 401.
3. 183 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 119, 185
So. 2d 529 (1966).
4. 184 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 452, 187
So. 2d 438 (1966).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 12, 1790, 2446 (1870).
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honestly believed to be the real owner. ' 6 Taking this statement
from Civil Code article 3484, without the full context of articles
3483-3486, seems to confuse the concepts of good faith and just
title. The court then reached the conclusion, "In the absence
of good faith and just title, the ten year acquisitive prescription
has no force here."7
In the facts of the present case, as found by the court, there
can hardly be any doubt that the evidence rebutted the presump-
tion of good faith of the possessor.8 From the court's brief con-
clusion, it might further be implied that an absolute nullity can
never be a just title, yet this, as a separate and an important
legal question, was not discussed.
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Classification of the Cause of Action
A substantial percentage of the actual problems which arise
in connection with liberative prescription revolve around the
nature of the cause of action against which the prescription is
pleaded. There is no limit to the kinds of fact situations which
may develop, and as long as there are so many different pre-
scriptive period rules there will be litigation to fix the classifica-
tion of the cause of action.
In the case of Birdsong v. Barber,9 the defendant termite con-
tractor pleaded the one-year tort prescription 0 against an action
for termite damages which developed on account of the defend-
ant's negligence in failing to inspect the upper story of the
house. The court held that this action was based on breach of
contract and therefore it was subject only to the ten-year pre-
scription.- As the law now stands, this decision is correct; if
the prescriptive periods for tort and contract actions were the
same, this case and so many like it would be obviated. Whether
the difference warrants continuation is a question of policy in-
terests in our society and it merits serious consideration.
6. 184 So. 2d at 281.
7. Ibid. For a well-drawn distinction between just title and good faith, see
Bel v. Manuel, 234 La. 135, 99 So. 2d 58 (1958), and comments in 19 LA. L. REV.
327-28 (1959).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3481 (1870).
9. 176 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536 (1870).
11. Id. art. 3544.
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A similar problem of classification of the cause of action, but
conceivably a different combination of policy interests, was in-
volved in Victory Oil Co. v. Perret.12 The one-year prescription
against an action in redhibition 8 was pleaded against a claim
for damage to trucks caused by delivery of a type of oil different
from that specified in the sale contract. Even though there may
have been negligence in delivering the wrong kind of fuel, the
court held it was an action for damages arising out of breach of
contract and subject only to the ten-year prescription.1 4
Another problem of classification occurred in Giroir v.
Dumesnil,15 where a declaratory judgment action sought recogni-
tion of ownership of land purchased from the legatees of a testa-
mentary succession. Prescriptive pleas of five years as against
the nullity of a testament 16 and ten years against a personal
action 17 were properly displaced by the classification of the
action as one for the ownership of immovable property for
which the prescription is thirty years.' 8
Interruption of Prescription
In LeBoeuf v. Riera,19 suit was filed in 1962 for the balance
due on an open account for insurance premiums, the last of
which had been charged in 1958. Two payments made in 1959
were unequivocally identified with two specific invoices and, by
reason of this imputation, did not interrupt the three-year pre-
scription against open accounts20 because these payments could
not be treated as partial payments in reduction of the entire
indebtedness.
The question of interruption by the institution of a lawsuit
in a federal court was the issue in Venterella v. Pace.21 Suit was
filed, but the citation was not served, within the prescriptive
period. The decisive issue, therefore, was the question of the
12. 183 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 65, 184
So.2d 735 (1966).
13. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2534, 2546 (1870).
14. Id. art. 3544.
15. 248 La. 1037, 184 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (1966).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3542 (1870).
17. Id. art. 3544.
18. Id. arts. 3548, 3499; Buckley v. Catlett, 203 La. 54, 13 So. 2d 384 (1943).
19. 176 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3538 (1870).
21. 180 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), writ refused, 248 La. 796, 182
So.2d 73 (1966).
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competence of the court.22 Lack of diversity of citizenship23
caused the dismissal of that suit, and it was therefore not a court
of competent jurisdiction, so that the timely filing alone did not
create an interruption of the prescription.
Choice of Cause of Action
In some kinds of situations, a person may have a choice of
two causes of actions, and if his claim for damages results from
breach of contract, he can avoid the one-year prescription against
torts. Sometimes a person may have two distinct claims with
an independent separate prescription running against each. A
decision which could create many hardship cases was rendered
in Williamson v. S.S. Kresge Co.24 An injured employee accepted
a permanent disability compensation award for a certain length
of time until it was discovered that these payments were being
made in error since the -occupation and the business were not
hazardous. The ensuing suit in tort was dismissed on the ground
of one-year liberative prescription which had meanwhile lapsed.
It may be technically correct to say that ignorance of the law is
no excuse and that the employee has slept on his right. There-
fore, since a suit in tort is precluded where a claim is covered
by the workman's compensation act,25 it may be necessary for
an injured person to get a judicial determination in order to
protect himself against the risk of an erroneous award.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL SERVITUDES
Minority Suspension
The writer has already discussed at considerable length the
Supreme Court's decision in Mire v. Hawkins,1 in which the
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3518 (1870) ; LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950).
23. One of the defendants as well as the plaintiffs were citizens of Louisiana.
24. 186 So. 2d.696 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 580, 187
So. 2d 741 (1966).
25. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966). The court's decision on the issue on
which writs were granted is thoroughly discussed in Hardy, Comments on Mire
v. Hawkins, 27 LA. L. REv. 5 (1966).
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